By Brooke Steiner
Internet censorship has long been a controversial issue which involves the selective restriction of information.[1]This could simply be as mundane as upholding copyright laws, but censorship also extends into political repression and human rights violations.[2] Restrictive and authoritarian regimes have been shown to be far more likely to suppress political content to subdue criticism.[3] Russia has a particularly egregious reputation for censorship and restriction of speech online. Since 2012, the Kremlin has consistently acted to create legislation aimed at regulating online content and attempting to garner the support of the Russian people in doing so.[4] This is significant especially because it has been found that Internet Literacy is negatively correlated with the perception of a necessity of government surveillance (people who are less familiar with the Internet tend to perceive a higher necessity of surveillance).[5] The Russian government, then, draws attention to the dangers of the Internet and social media, including risks of hate speech, crime, violent protests and fake news.[6] The government frames laws as protecting citizens and their rights from these threats.[7] Furthermore, these threats are proclaimed to be both internal and external and are subsequently used to justify political repression through online censorship and strict controls that are characteristic of authoritarianism.[8]
The fraction of individuals who have consistent access to the Internet in their daily lives constitutes something called an Internet penetration rate.[9] Depending on the penetration rate of a state and the ideology of the government, authorities may approach Internet censorship in different ways.[10] For our purposes, Internet censorship is a concern in the context of human rights under repressive governments, such as in China and Russia, and functions by means of legislation, societal expectations, and technical censorship.[11] Technical Internet censorship methodology can be categorized into three generalizations, the first of which involves automation of filtering information and surveillance.[12] This can be done through the blocking of IP addresses, censorship of information, sifting for certain words, and other methods to prevent an individual from receiving or sending information.[13] The implementation of second-generation technical censorship involves unofficial government inquiries for the deletion of specific information.[14]Finally, third-generation technical methods entail heightened control of Internet communications using state-led propaganda or information campaigns.[15] According to Rashid Gabdulhakov, Russia accomplishes this through “(1) legal frameworks; (2) targeted individuals/online speech; and (3) state-loyal vigilantes/citizen counter-forces.”[16] As a result, seemingly trivial actions online such as ‘liking’ a picture can lead an individual to be accused of crimes such as terrorism, extremism, or xenophobia,[17] receive a prison sentence, have to pay fines, or bear other consequences.[18]
In politically repressive regimes, the Dark Web, which can be accessed via the Tor browser, creates a unique opportunity to share and access information that would otherwise be censored.[19] However, it should be noted that some moderately restrictive environments actually result in a lessened likelihood of Tor usage.[20] Likelihood of anonymity technology usage online is primarily determined by political need (the benefit of use, which is proportional to the repressive qualities of the state) and opportunity (the likelihood of being able to use the technology without facing repercussions from the state, which is determined by level of access and the practiced methods of government intervention, forming an inverse relationship with political repression).[21] This means that a state with a highly repressive regime will have less Tor usage than an otherwise identical but more democratic state. It is also notable that Tor bridge use and political repression have been established as having a very strong correlation.[22] This is particularly important because Tor bridges enable an individual to use the Tor network in a way that is far more difficult to track or otherwise restrict when compared to Tor relays, which are visible to the public and could be blocked as a means of censorship.[23]
This paper analyzes the effects of political events and subsequent censorship in Russia on Tor usage by using data provided by Tor Metrics. Tor bridge usage[24] and Tor relay usage[25] data concerning the dates January 1, 2014, to January 18, 2024, were compiled and were then examined for anomalies or irregularities. I was specifically interested in the impact of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Hence, I decided to use compiled data from December 31, 2020, through February 18, 2024. Although the invasion of Ukraine happened in February of 2022, I included data from before this time to establish a baseline of what Tor usage had been in Russia prior to later events as a point of comparison. The data shown continues through to almost the present day to allow for more contemporary and relevant analysis. A table outlining possible censorship events[26] adapted from a table used by Tor Metrics and a visualization of data are shown below. These data can be used in conjunction to examine for possible relationships between variables. While it is difficult to establish specific cause and effect relationships, this data is nonetheless important to understand and analyze current events concerning Russian politics, digital and Internet censorship, and the role of the Russian regime in broader societal contexts and war.
On December 7, 2021, the United States government threatened sanctions on Russia if it invaded Ukraine.[27]Around December 10 of 2021, there is an observable beginning of drastic reduction in Tor relay connections in Russia. On December 12, 2021, the G7 also threatened Russia with grave consequences if it invaded Ukraine.[28] The drastic decline is further intensified until about December 14, 2021. Simultaneously, it can be observed that Tor bridge connections had steeply risen from about November 30, 2021, which was around the time that satellite imagery had come out showing the mobilization of a hundred thousand Russian troops gathering near the Ukrainian border.[29] On December 17, 2021, Russia presented the United States and NATO with an ultimatum to stop the deployment of any military in eastern Europe and to vow to never include Ukraine or any other states of the former Soviet Union in the Alliance, or to risk further threats and escalations by Russia.[30] This date saw a continued dramatic increase in Tor bridge users (paired with a similarly dramatic decrease in relay users). A downward trend of Tor relay users continued, and bridge connections even decreased to an extent until a few days before Russia launched their invasion in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.[31] This saw another steep (though less drastic in magnitude) drop in Tor relay users, as well as a very strong increase in bridge connections in Russia. It is notable, however, that Tor relay users and bridge connections are represented by two different scales. Although there was a drastic increase in bridge connections in tandem with these events, these are represented in the tens of thousands, whereas Tor relay connections declined by the hundreds of thousands. As is discussed earlier in this paper, severely politically repressive states frequently have less utilization of anonymity-granting technologies, wherein this may be a prime example.
As the war settled into ‘normalcy,’ bridge connections dropped somewhat and stabilized and relay connections even increased slightly until about September 28, 2022, to the end of October when there is another uptick in bridge connections observable on the graph and relay connections drop again. Around this same time (September 21, 2022), Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree for partial mobilization of reserve troops.[32] Likely, this renewed domestic concerns and may have contributed to the pattern at hand.
Recently, Tor relay connections have demonstrated a decrease yet again, while Tor bridge connections approach an all-time high. This happens around the same time of the death of Alexei Navalny in a Russian prison,[33] new sanctions imposed on Russia from the United States, and otherwise increased tensions.
In conclusion, censorship events and political turmoil in Russia since 2020 are correlated with an increased use of Tor bridges and a stark decrease in Tor relay usage. This may be attributed to the presence of fear, authoritarian controls put in place in attempts to quiet dissent, or various other forms of censorship. As events continue to unfold, Tor user numbers by both relay connections and bridge connections have changed (often prior to or concurrent with actual significant events) and continue to fluctuate in the present. Future research should seek to exploit these anomalies for predictive purposes using regression models and further statistical analyses.
Bibliography
Al Jazeera. “Timeline: How the Ukraine-Russia Crisis Reached the Brink of War.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/13/timeline-how-the-ukraine-russia-crisis-reached-the-brink-of-war.
Bykov, Il’ia A., Andrei Y. Dorskii, and Irina A. Gladchenko. “Trying to Keep Bloggers Under Control: The Birth and Death of the ‘Bloggers Law’ in Russia (2014–2017).” Edited by Svetlana S. Bodrunova, Olessia Koltsova, Asbjørn Følstad, Harry Halpin, Polina Kolozaridi, Leonid Yuldashev, Anna Smoliarova, and Heiko Niedermayer. Internet Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 11551 (2019): 261–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17705-8_23.
“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dated September 21, 2022 No. 647 ∙ Official Publication of Legal Acts.” Accessed February 23, 2024. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202209210001.
Dinev, Tamara. “Internet Users’ Beliefs about Government Surveillance The Role of Social Awareness and Internet Literacy.” In Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2008), 275–275. Waikoloa, HI: IEEE, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2008.216.
Ermoshina, Ksenia, Benjamin Loveluck, and Francesca Musiani. “A Market of Black Boxes: The Political Economy of Internet Surveillance and Censorship in Russia.” Journal of Information Technology and Politics 19, no. 1 (2022): 18–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2021.1905972.
Gabdulhakov, Rashid. “(Con)Trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests, State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter-Forces in Russia.” Global Crime 21, no. 3–4 (October 1, 2020): 283–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2020.1719836.
Jardine, Eric. “Tor, What Is It Good for? Political Repression and the Use of Online Anonymity-Granting Technologies.” New Media and Society 20, no. 2 (February 1, 2018): 435–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816639976.
Nisbet, Erik C., Olga Kamenchuk, and Aysenur Dal. “A Psychological Firewall? Risk Perceptions and Public Support for Online Censorship in Russia*.” Social Science Quarterly 98, no. 3 (2017): 958–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12435.
“Putin Critic Alexei Navalny Dies in Arctic Circle Jail, Says Russia.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68315943.
“Putin’s December 2021 Ultimatum.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ops/putin-2021-12.htm.
Ratz, Alexander, Humeyra Pamuk, and Humeyra Pamuk. “G7 Warns Russia of ‘massive Consequences’ If Ukraine Is Attacked.” Reuters, December 12, 2021, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/g7-warns-russia-massive-consequences-over-ukraine-draft-statement-2021-12-12/.
US News & World Report. “Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis.” Accessed February 23, 2024. //www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict.
“Users – Tor Metrics.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2023-11-25&end=2024-02-23&country=ru.
“Users – Tor Metrics.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2023-11-25&end=2024-02-23&country=ru&events=off.
“Users – Tor Metrics.” Accessed February 23, 2024. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2021-11-01&end=2021-12-31&country=ru.
Wang, Dakuo, and Gloria Mark. “Internet Censorship in China: Examining User Awareness and Attitudes.” ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 22, no. 6 (December 1, 2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2818997.
Warf, Barney. “Geographies of Global Internet Censorship.” GeoJournal 76, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-010-9393-3.
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Maria Petrova, and Ruben Enikolopov. “Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media.” Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (2020): 415–38. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081919-050239.
Works Cited
[1] Ksenia Ermoshina, Benjamin Loveluck, and Francesca Musiani, “A Market of Black Boxes: The Political Economy of Internet Surveillance and Censorship in Russia,” Journal of Information Technology and Politics 19, no. 1 (2022): 18–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2021.1905972.
[2] Ermoshina, Loveluck, and Musiani.
[3] Ermoshina, Loveluck, and Musiani.
[4] Erik C. Nisbet, Olga Kamenchuk, and Aysenur Dal, “A Psychological Firewall? Risk Perceptions and Public Support for Online Censorship in Russia*,” Social Science Quarterly 98, no. 3 (2017): 958–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12435.
[5] Tamara Dinev, “Internet Users’ Beliefs about Government Surveillance The Role of Social Awareness and Internet Literacy,” in Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2008) (2008 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Waikoloa, HI: IEEE, 2008), 275–275, https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2008.216.
[6] Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Maria Petrova, and Ruben Enikolopov, “Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media,” Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (2020): 415–38, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081919-050239.
[7] Il’ia A. Bykov, Andrei Y. Dorskii, and Irina A. Gladchenko, “Trying to Keep Bloggers Under Control: The Birth and Death of the ‘Bloggers Law’ in Russia (2014–2017),” ed. Svetlana S. Bodrunova et al., Internet Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 11551 (2019): 261–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17705-8_23.
[8] Nisbet, Kamenchuk, and Dal, “A Psychological Firewall?”
[9] Barney Warf, “Geographies of Global Internet Censorship,” GeoJournal 76, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-010-9393-3.
[10] Warf.
[11] Dakuo Wang and Gloria Mark, “Internet Censorship in China: Examining User Awareness and Attitudes,” ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 22, no. 6 (December 1, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1145/2818997.
[12] Wang and Mark.
[13] Wang and Mark.
[14] Wang and Mark.
[15] Wang and Mark.
[16] Gabdulhakov, 284.
[17] Gabdulhakov.
[18] Gabdulhakov.
[19] Eric Jardine, “Tor, What Is It Good for? Political Repression and the Use of Online Anonymity-Granting Technologies,” New Media and Society 20, no. 2 (February 1, 2018): 435–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816639976.
[20] Jardine.
[21] Jardine.
[22] Jardine.
[23] Jardine.
[24] “Users – Tor Metrics,” accessed February 23, 2024, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2023-11-25&end=2024-02-23&country=ru.
[25] “Users – Tor Metrics,” accessed February 23, 2024, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2023-11-25&end=2024-02-23&country=ru&events=off.
[26] “Users – Tor Metrics,” accessed February 23, 2024, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2021-11-01&end=2021-12-31&country=ru.
[27] “Timeline: How the Ukraine-Russia Crisis Reached the Brink of War,” Al Jazeera, accessed February 23, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/13/timeline-how-the-ukraine-russia-crisis-reached-the-brink-of-war.
[28] Alexander Ratz, Humeyra Pamuk, and Humeyra Pamuk, “G7 Warns Russia of ‘massive Consequences’ If Ukraine Is Attacked,” Reuters, December 12, 2021, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/g7-warns-russia-massive-consequences-over-ukraine-draft-statement-2021-12-12/.
[29] “Timeline.”
[30] “Putin’s December 2021 Ultimatum,” accessed February 23, 2024, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ops/putin-2021-12.htm.
[31] “Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis,” US News & World Report, accessed February 23, 2024, //www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict.
[32] “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dated September 21, 2022 No. 647 ∙ Official Publication of Legal Acts,” accessed February 23, 2024, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202209210001.
[33] “Putin Critic Alexei Navalny Dies in Arctic Circle Jail, Says Russia,” accessed February 23, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68315943.